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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
DISTINCTION BETWEEN DISCOUNT AND PURCHASE.
Money-lending by non-banking institutions has entered upon a
period of tremendous expansion in recent years. From the stand-
point of public policy, it would seem that such a potential menace
should be compelled to subject itself to the salutary supervision and
regulation provided for in our own Banking Laws. However that
may be, there is no escape from the fact that the Legislature'
has already spoken on this point in unmistakable terms. 2 Whether
the Legislature in its zeal overreached itself and acted unwisely is
surely no question for a judicial tribunal.
If these enactments are over-drastic it is for the Legislature
to undo its mischief, and not for the courts.3 For, of course, it
is not within the province of the courts to question the wisdom of
the Legislature. To declare that the Legislature did not mean
what it said would be, in effect, sheer judicial usurption of the
legislative function.
Yet it appears that in a recent decision, Meserole Securities
Co., Inc. v. Cosman,4 this is exactly what the court has done. In
the instant case, the plaintiff, a domestic corporation organized
under the Stock Corporation Law,5 sued to recover upon two prom-
issory notes made and delivered by a corporation, Bischoff, Inc.,
'Article II, Section 22, of the General Corporation Law of the Stats
of New York provides: (1929) (formerly Section 29, renumbered 22,
Amended by L. 1929, Ch. 650, Sec. 1).
"PROHIBITION oF BANKING POWERs. No corporation, domestic or
foreign, other than a corporation formed under or subject to the banking
laws of this state or of the United States, except as permitted by such
laws, shall by any implication or construction be deemed to possess the
power of carrying on the business of discounting bills, notes, or other
evidences of debt, of receiving deposits, of buying and selling bills of
exchange, or of issuing bills, notes or other evidences of debt for circula-
tion as money, or of engaging in any other form of banking. * * *,
'Section 140 of the Banking Laws: Prohibitions against encroachments
upon certain powers of banks (L. 1914, Ch. 369).
"No corporation, domestic or foreign, other than a national bank
or a federal reserve bank, unless expressly authorized by the laws of
the state, shall employ any part of its property, or be in any way
interested in any fund which shall be employed for the purpose of re-
ceiving deposits, making discounts, or issuing notes or other evidences
of debt to be loaned or put into circulation as money. All notes, and
other securities for the payment of any money or the delivery of any
property, made or given to any such association, institution or com-
pany, or made or given to secure the payment of any money loaned or
discounted by any corporation of its officers, contrary to the provisions
of this section shall be void." (Italics ours.)
'Chelten Trust Co. v. National Automatic Press Co., 216 App. Div. 380,
215 N. Y. Supp. 200 (2nd Dept. 1926).
'253 N. Y. 130, 170 N. E. 519 (1930).
'Incorporated under the laws of the State of New York, 1922; Stock
Corporation Law, Sec. 5, L. 1923, Ch. 787. Derived from Section 2, Bus.
Corp. L.
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not here a party. The payee was the defendant, Cosman, and he
and his co-defendants are sued as indorsers by the plaintiff, a holder
in due course and for value. Each note was in the face amount
of $4,400 but it is conceded that the plaintiff paid for each only
the sum of $4,000.6
All of the defendants interposed a defense to the effect that
the notes were invalid in the hands of the plaintiff, and that it could
not recover thereon, for the reason that it had obtained title thereto
contrary to law.7 Its acquisition of the notes, it was asserted, was
in violation of certain statutes, particularly section 140 of the Bank-
ing Law,8 and section 22 of the General Corporation Law.9
The trial Court, after hearing the testimony on other branches
of the case involving the defendant, Cosman, sustained the defense,
adjudged the notes void and dismissed the complaint.' 0
The Appellate Division, by a divided court and with violently
conflicting opinions, reversed and ordered a new trial." Brief
consideration of both majority and dissenting opinions throws much
light on the ultimate disposition of the case. Similarly, in the Court
of Appeals, which affirmed the Appellate Division, we have a di-
vided court, J. Lehman for the greater part agreeing with J. Finch
-Pound, O'Brien and Hobbs concurring, and J. Kellogg revoic-
ing the opinion of J. O'Malley, J. Crane concurring.' 2
It is immaterial what the plaintiff claims under its certificate of
incorporation, for unquestionably such power is subject to and
must yield to the Banking Statute in force.' 3
The sole question before the Court was whether a non-banking
corporation, which had engaged in numerous and repeated transac-
tions of discounting notes, could recover on notes so discounted in
the face of the express prohibition of former section 22 (now 18)
of the General Corporation Law,'1 4 and in the face of the positive
and mandatory language of section 140 of the Banking Law, which
unequivocally states that the notes so discounte'd are void.15
It is difficult in the face of all authorities to agree with the
Court in saving that the notes at issue were merely "purchased" and
not "discounted." Our first problem is to define the proper signifi-
cance of the term "discount" and so determine whether the notes
at issue were discounted or purchased.
'These facts were conceded and set forth in a stipulation read into the
record at the trial.T Supra notes 1 and 2.
'Supra note 2.
'Supra note 1.
" 131 Misc. 361, 226 N. Y. Supp. 667 (1928).
"226 App. Div. 21, 234 N. Y. Supp. 260 (1st Dept. 1929).
" Supra note 4.
"New York State Loan & T-rust Co. v. Helmer, 77 N. Y. 54 (1879);
Pratt v. Short, 79 N. Y. 437 (1880).
"Supra note 1.
" Supra note 2.
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Baldwin's Century Edition of Bouvier's Law Dictionary, under
title "Discount," states:
"There is a difference between buying a bill and dis-
counting it. The former word is used when the seller does
not endorse the bill and is not accountable for its payment." 16
(Italics ours.)
And in similar vein:
"Buying a Note Distinguished From Discount. 'Buying
a note' as distinguished from discounting a note, is used when
the seller does not discount the note and is not accountable
for its payment." 17
The distinction that Bouvier draws between purchase and dis-
count is supported by weighty authority.1 8 In every single instance,
without exception, wherever and whenever a distinction is drawn
between purchase and discount, the point of difference is declared
to be precisely this, that in the transaction of discount, the seller
endorses his name on the instrument, thus making himself person-
ally liable thereon. 19 Where the transfer of the note is made by
assignment or by endorsement without recourse, it is a purchase
rather than a discount, for in such case the seller is not accountable
for its payment.2 0 The distinction between purchase and discount
depends upon just this fact of personal liability of the seller through
endorsement.2 '
From the foregoing, since the defendants in the case at bar
were sued as endorsers, no conclusion can be drawn other than that
the transaction was one of discount.
We turn then to the interpretation of the statutes involved, the
restrictions of section 18 22 and the prohibitions of 140.23
It is not necessary to dwell at any great length upon the con-
struction to be given to the two statutes herein involved. They
are in no way ambiguous, and hence there is no need for judicial
"Bouvier's Dictionary (1927), p. 204.
(1925) 13 Ky. L. Rev. 777.
" Metcalf v. Morse Iron Works, 14 N. Y. Anno. Cases, 28, 84 N. Y.
Supp. 582 (1st Dept. 1903); Am. & Eng. Encyc. of Law (2nd ed. 1905), p.
471; Black's Law Dict. (2nd ed. 1910), p. 374; Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn.
206 (1878).
"Freeman v. Brittin, 17 N. J. L. 191, 206 (1839).
"Farmers & Mechanics Bank v. Baldwin, 23 Minn. 198 (1878); Free-
man v. Brittin, ibid.
'Magee on Banks and Banking (3rd ed. 1909), p. 428.
' Supra note 1.
'Supra note 2.
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interpretation.2 4 When plain specific language is used, the meaning
may not be changed, nor can there be a departure from such mean-
ing in deference to any supposed intent.2 5 It is only when the lan-
guage of a statute leaves some doubt as to its purpose and intent
that rules of construction are to be exercised.2 6 These statutes are
commonly known as "Restraining Acts," for a reason best under-
stood by their captions--"Prohibition of Banking Powers," 27 and
"Prohibitions Against Encroachments Upon Certain Powers of
Banks." 28
The first "Restraining Act" was passed in 1804, re-enacted in
1813,29 and extended in 1818.30 The purpose of these acts was to
exclude corporations, associations and individuals, other than banks
so authorized to act, from conducting a banking business in either
department of issue, deposit, or discount.3' In 1837, the Legislature
repealed those restrictions pertaining to individuals and unincor-
porated associations only, from keeping offices of deposit and dis-
count.8 2 Any individual or unincorporated association could then
discount commercial paper.33 With the intent of the Legislature so
clearly indicated and defined, 4 let us weigh the opinions in the in-
stant case.
Despite the fact that today we have virtually a restatement of
the former "Restraining Acts" in our current laws,3 5 after a cen-
tury or more the Court decides that these statutes do not mean what
they clearly say-that discounting, when taken by itself, though done
repeatedly and continually, is not prohibited by statute, nor are the
notes dealt with in such transactions void. They say that the re-
striction applies only when such discounting is a part of the business
of banking.36
Can it be conceived that such construction would be resorted
to in the event that some other function peculiar to banks, such
as "receiving deposits" or "issuing notes to be put into circulation
as money," had been exercised?
"People ex rel. N. Y. Cent. & H. R. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 208 N. Y. 421,
102 N. E. 566 (1913); People ex rel. L. & N. Y. R. R. Co. v. Sobmer, 217 N.
Y. 443, 112 N. E. 181 (1916).
'Benton v. Wickwire, 54 N. Y. 225 (1876); In re Village of Middle-
ton, 82 N. Y. 196 (1880); People v. L. I. R. R. Co., 194 N. Y. 130, 87 N. E.
79 (1909); People ex rel. Rand v. Craig, 231 N. Y. 216, 131 N. E. 894(1926).
Supra notes 24, 25.
"Supra note 1.
"Supra note 2.
2 Rev. Stat. 234.
Laws 1818, Ch. 236.
N. Y. Firenen's Institute v. Ely & Parsons, 2 Cow. 678 (N. Y. 1824).
"Laws 1837, Ch. 20.
'Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N. Y. 97 (1857).
"Ibid.
Supra notes 1 and 2.
Supra note 4.
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But O'Malley, J., of the Appellate Division, in his dissenting
opinion makes no effort to distort the obvious meaning expressed by
the simple language of the statute, and his conclusion is supported
not only by a resum6 of decided cases, but by a simple and convinc-
ing analysis of the grammatical construction of the statute.3 7  This
opinion, confirmed by Kellogg, J., of the Court of Appeals, 38 dis-
perses all doubt that the transactions by the plaintiff in the case at
bar were wholly in defiance of clearly written statutes-statutes
which have been repeatedly re-enacted in order to secure the public
from any unscrupulous corporations who make a practice of such
illegal discounting of notes and which are susceptible of but one
interpretation.
ROBERT D. FLEMING.
EFFECT OF FALSITY OF MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS IN AN
INSURANCE POLICY.
It is an elementary rule of agency that notice acquired by an
agent during the transaction which it affects, binds the principal as
fully as if he acquired the notice in person, even though the agent
does not in fact inform the principal.' An exception is made to
this rule where an agent is engaged in a scheme to defraud his prin-
cipal. In such a case the presumption that the agent will com-
municate all material facts to his principal no longer prevails, and
the principal is not bound by the knowledge acquired by his agent
while engaged in such fraudulent purpose.2
Another important exception to the general rule stated is brought
about, in New York, by section 58 of the Insurance Law.3 This
section states that the policy and anything attached thereto consti-
' Supra note 11.
'S rpra note 4.
'Jefferson County Bank v. Dewey, 197 N. Y. 14, 90 N. E. 113 (1909);
Small v. Housman, 208 N. Y. 115, 101 N. E. 700 (1913); Corrigan v. Bobbs-
Merrill Co., 228 N. Y. 58, 126 N. E. 260 (1920).
' Natl. Life Insurance Co. v. Minch, 53 N. Y. 144 (1873); Crooks v.
Peoples Natl. Bank, 177 N. Y. 68, 69 N. E. 228 (1903); Prudential Insur-
ance Company v. Natl. Bank of Commerce, 227 N. Y. 510, 125 N. E. 824
(1920).
"Every policy of insurance issued or delivered within the state on or
after the first day of January, 1907, by any life insurance corporation doing
business within the state shall contain the entire contract between the parties
and nothing shall be incorporated therein by reference to any constitution.
by-laws, rules, application or other writings unless the same are endorsed
upon or attached to the policy when issued, and all statements purporting to
be made by the insured shall in the absence of fraud be deemed representa-
tions and not warranties. Any waiver of the provisions of this section shall
be void."
